Gay A. Bradshaw has written a perplexing book. From the book's title, I anticipated, perhaps, a book like Colinvaux's (1978) Why Big Fierce Animals Are Rare. The book is more like Griffin's (1992) Animal Minds, which also started with a good premise and then got into trouble with overextrapolation and misinterpretation of the biological literature.
Using 7 examples, Bradshaw argues that predatory vertebrates (including sharks) are far more conscious and complex in their behavior than people, especially wildlife biologists, believe they are. The 7 examples are white sharks (Carcharodon carcharias), grizzly bears (Ursus arctos), orcas (Orcinus orca), crocodilians (Crocodylomorpha), rattlesnakes (Viperidae), pumas (Puma concolor), and coyotes (Canis latrans). Bradshaw attempts to use each example species to focus attention on a "psychological concept and its neurobiological foundations" (p. xviii). The concepts are that: 1) predatory vertebrates have individual personalities, 2) that their experiences while maturing affect their behavioral (and neurological) development, 3) that these vertebrates have a sense of self, 4) that they have emotional intelligence, 5) that they have social instincts and a moral sense, 6) that they are subjected to psychological trauma by humans, and 7) that they are complex. Given that vertebrate brains are all built from the same underlying pattern and that predators face challenges that require behavioral flexibility and intelligence, I found Bradshaw's concepts reasonable, and mostly obvious, as starting points for discussion. The irony, as it turns out, is that I agree with Bradshaw on these topics, but disagree with her on many other things.
Bradshaw laces each chapter with perceptive anecdotes. I learned much from these anecdotes and appreciated the stories of individual predators' lives. Some of the anecdotes are truly fun to read; others are stressful, showing the barbarity of some people. And some are confusing, such as the chapter on grizzly bears starting with an anecdote on polar bears (Ursus maritimus) and the first 6 pages of the chapter on crocodilians being anecdotes about Komodo dragons (Varanus komodoensis) and discussion of the evolution of birds' brains. With the anecdotes, Bradshaw caused me to become cautious about accepting all of her interpretations and conclusions. Each anecdote is presented as though the teller, a biologist or naturalist (defined loosely), had absolute knowledge, retold his or her story with perfect accuracy, and interpreted predators' thought processes correctly. Bradshaw then develops her arguments from the perspective that the interpreted thought processes are a "given," and weaves in interpretations of the biological literature, much of it research on humans, to reach the conclusion that each of her original concepts is true for all vertebrate predators.
Bradshaw supplies abundant footnotes, many referring to the biological literature. Nonetheless, most footnotes refer to personal interviews, websites, and publications that did not receive peer review. Bradshaw assigns equal authority to peer-reviewed research results and to biologists' and naturalists' speculations expressed in interviews. She expects her readers to make the same leap of faith. This reader did not leap.
Repeatedly, Bradshaw categorizes all wildlife managers, all wildlife biologists, and all other field biologists as dolts and ruffians, all of whom believe that all predators are best annihilated. She argues that they blindly follow what they learned in school or on the job, accepting on faith that eliminating predators is good. She appears to believe that not a single one of us has ever read Leopold's (1948) "Thinking Like A Mountain" in A Sand County Almanac. In stark contradiction, then, she praises the field biologists whose anecdotes, insights, and publications agree with the concept she is trying to defend in a given chapter. Somehow, Bradshaw defines these particular field biologists not to be members of the group of all field biologists. From my experience, however, the field biologists that Bradshaw praises are typical field biologists and not exceptions.
Bradshaw expects that readers will accept on faith that her interpretations and extrapolations from anecdotes and from the biomedical literature on humans are correct. Nonetheless, on page after page of my copy of the book, I noted gaps in logic and lack of documentation. Had I not been reading the book to write a review, I would have put it down before finishing the first chapter or two. Putting the book down, however, would have led me to miss many interesting anecdotes; I particularly liked those on rattlesnakes.
In the end, I have no fear that mammalogists will be misled by Bradshaw's lack of documentation and her gaps in logic. I do worry that well-educated, nonscientist readers will conclude from the book that the evidence for Bradshaw's 7 concepts is stronger than it really is. I expect that all 7 of Bradshaw's concepts will be shown in the
